The Effects of feedback on judgmental interval predictions by Bolger, F. & Onkal Atay, D.
www.elsevier.com/locate/ijforecast
International Journal of Forecasting 20 (2004) 29–39The effects of feedback on judgmental interval predictions
Fergus Bolger*, Dilek O¨nkal-Atay
Faculty of Business Administration, Bilkent University, Ankara, TurkeyAbstract
The majority of studies of probability judgment have found that judgments tend to be overconfident and that the degree of
overconfidence is greater the more difficult the task. Further, these effects have been resistant to attempts to ‘debias’ via
feedback. We propose that under favourable conditions, provision of appropriate feedback should lead to significant
improvements in calibration, and the current study aims to demonstrate this effect. To this end, participants first specified ranges
within which the true values of time series would fall with a given probability. After receiving feedback, forecasters constructed
intervals for new series, changing their probability values if desired. The series varied systematically in terms of their
characteristics including amount of noise, presentation scale, and existence of trend. Results show that forecasts were initially
overconfident but improved significantly after feedback. Further, this improvement was not simply due to ‘hedging’, i.e.
shifting to very high probability estimates and extremely wide intervals; rather, it seems that calibration improvement was
chiefly obtained by forecasters learning to evaluate the extent of the noise in the series.
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1. Introduction overconfidence depends on task difficulty such thatResearch into the accuracy (or ‘calibration’) of
judgmental forecasts has produced consistent findings
of overconfidence (see Lichtenstein, Fischhoff, &
Phillips, 1982; Arkes, 2001, for reviews). To give a
specific example, if a weather forecaster predicts a
70% chance of rain on 100 different days, then rain
should be observed on 70 of those days for the
forecaster to be perfectly calibrated—typically what
is found is that rain will occur on fewer than 70 days.
A related finding is that the extent of observed0169-2070/$ - see front matter D 2003 International Institute of Forecaste
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E-mail address: fmib1@le.ac.uk (F. Bolger).the more difficult the task, the greater the degree of
overconfidence—this is known as the ‘hard–easy’
effect (Lichtenstein et al., 1982). Good calibration
may be observed for tasks with an average proportion
correct around 75%, while underconfidence may be
observed for tasks with proportions correct greater
than 75%. However, most tasks have a lower propor-
tion correct than 75%, thus contributing to the overall
finding of overconfidence (see, e.g. Suantak, Bolger,
& Ferrell, 1996, for a review).
The currently most favoured explanation for over-
confidence is that it occurs due to some kind of error
in mapping true feelings of confidence on to the
required response scale (see Ayton & McClelland,
1997, for a review). It should therefore follow that
response error and overconfidence could be reducedrs. Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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should be able to learn the appropriate mappings.
However, studies of probability judgment which make
use of general-knowledge questions have typically
failed to significantly reduce overconfidence with
feedback. These tests normally require judgments
for unrelated events (see, e.g. Keren, 1991) and
answers which are deliberately selected to be count-
er-intuitive (see, for example, Gigerenzer, Hoffrage, &
Kleinbolting, 1991)—neither of these conditions are
ideal for learning. In contrast, a forecasting task offers
better opportunities for learning from feedback, as
probability judgments have to be made repeatedly for
related events which have not been selected to be
misleading. In fact, there is some evidence to suggest
that overconfidence may not be as high in forecasting
tasks (Wright & Ayton, 1986). Also, excellent cali-
bration has been reported with experts in weather
forecasting and in the game of bridge; their perfor-
mance attributed in part to the availability of consis-
tent and timely outcome feedback (see Keren, 1987;
Murphy & Winkler, 1984, respectively).
However, this past work on forecasting has mainly
involved discrete judgmental probability forecasts (i.e.
the probability that the predicted event will occur). A
potentially simpler structure for eliciting and commu-
nicating the uncertainties inherent in the forecasting
process is provided by interval predictions (i.e. fore-
casts offering a minimum and a maximum bound
within which a future value is expected to lie with a
specified probability). Such forecasts depict an intui-
tively meaningful and uncomplicated format for both
the providers and users of predictions, whilst convey-
ing detailed information about future expectations
(O¨nkal-Atay, Thomson, & Pollock, 2002).
For interval estimation tasks, a judge would be
considered as perfectly calibrated if intervals given a
95% confidence coefficient actually contain the true
event on 95% of occasions. However, as for discrete
judgments, for non-forecasting tasks, overconfidence
is typically found with intervals. Thus, for instance,1 This assumes that the error is correctable rather than, for
instance, ‘cognitive noise’, which is not correctable. The response-
error models are not clear on this point but, given the observance of
good calibration in a number of studies, it seems there must be a
sizeable proportion of correctable error otherwise the response-error
models cannot be a full explanation for miscalibration.95% confidence interval assessments contain the true
event only 60–70% of the time. In other words,
confidence is generally too high relative to interval
width. Lichtenstein and Fischhoff (1980) found that
40% of realized values actually fall outside the 98%
intervals specified by participants in their study.
Striking examples in business settings are provided
by Russo and Schoemaker (1992), who asked man-
agers to estimate confidence intervals for uncertain
quantities in their own areas of expertise (e.g. petro-
leum, banking, advertising, data processing, etc.). The
resulting hit rates were 21–22% for 50% confidence
intervals, 36–58% for 90% intervals, and 20–42% for
95% confidence intervals.
Again, as for discrete judgments, there is some
evidence that overconfidence in interval judgments
with general knowledge items appear to resist im-
provement through practice with feedback. For in-
stance, Alpert and Raiffa (1982) used general
knowledge questions and after ten answers, urged
subjects to ‘Spread Those Extreme Fractiles! Be
honest with yourselves! Admit what you don’t
know!’ (p. 301). In the follow-up set of ten questions,
subjects showed only a modest improvement. Further,
Plous (1995) studied intervals given by groups (for
general knowledge items) and found that ‘overconfi-
dence persisted in the face of explicit warnings,
instructions to expand interval widths, and extended
group discussion’ (p. 451). However, there also exists
some evidence that calibration of interval judgments
may indeed improve with outcome feedback (O’Con-
nor & Lawrence, 1989; Roth, 1993). The O’Connor
and Lawrence (1989) study is of particular interest
because it investigates interval judgment in a fore-
casting task, thus containing two features that we
anticipate should permit well-calibrated forecasts to
be learned. The study to be reported here—where we
aim to demonstrate that, under favourable conditions,
overconfidence can be eliminated by the provision of
appropriate feedback—consequently bears certain
similarities to O’Connor and Lawrence’s (1989)
study.
O’Connor and Lawrence (1989) presented 33
students, who had no prior experience of time-series
forecasting or confidence intervals, with just one
time series. Each student received a different time
series and made seven forecasts, receiving outcome
feedback immediately after each forecast. The time
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competition (Makridakis et al., 1982). In our study
we wished to improve on this design in the follow-
ing ways:
1. increase the number of participants so as to improve
statistical power (we used 139 participants);
2. use participants with at least some basic knowledge
of time-series forecasting and confidence intervals
(our participants were management students com-
pleting a one-semester forecasting course and had
recently attended classes on these topics);
3. use constructed rather than real series in order to
control the series characteristics;
4. require each forecaster to make forecasts for a range
of different time series with varying characteristics
in order to simulate more realistic conditions for
both forecasting and learning (in our study the
participants made forecasts for 96 different series in
all); and
5. investigate the role of calibration feedback rather
than outcome feedback (i.e. summarize the per-
centage of hits over a number of trials at a
particular level of confidence).
The first four items are self-explanatory. The last item
needs to be expanded upon and it is to this issue we
turn to next.
A number of theorists have identified several dif-
ferent types of feedback. For example, a basic distinc-
tion has been made between outcome and cognitive
feedback (Todd & Hammond, 1965). The former
refers to the so-called ‘knowledge of results’ such as
the true value of some variable that was forecast;
whereas the latter refers to information about relations
such as that between the outcome and one’s prediction
(i.e. forecast error) or between the outcome and fea-
tures of the series (such as its trend or variability).
Balzer, Doherty, and O’Connor (1989) go on to
distinguish three components of cognitive feedback:
task information (TI), cognitive information (CI) and
functional validity information (FVI). With reference
to multiple cue probability learning (MCPL) tasks, TI
reflects relations between cues and criterion, for ex-
ample, the extent to which it is possible to estimate the
criterion value from cues and the intercorrelations
between cues. CI refers to relations between a person’s
judgment and the cues such as the level and variabilityof judgment across cues in a MCPL task. Finally, FVI
details relations between a judge’s cognitive strategy
and the task, for instance, the correlation between
judged and actual values of the criterion in MCPL
tasks. Balzer, Sulsky, Hammer, and Sumnar (1992)
found that only feedback about TI produced significant
improvements in performance on an MCPL task—
similar results have also been found by Balzer, Ham-
mer, Sumner, Birchenough, Martens, and Raymark
(1994).
Benson and O¨nkal (1992) made a somewhat
similar distinction to Balzer et al. (1989)—but in
relation to judgmental forecasting rather than MCPL
tasks—between performance and environmental
feedback. In particular, performance feedback
involves providing information about the accuracy
of judgment in general, such as information on the
calibration of judgmental forecasts, and can be
regarded as feedback of a form of FVI. Environmen-
tal feedback, on the other hand, involves providing
information about the event to be predicted, such as
its predictability from series characteristics, a form of
TI. Stone and Opel (2000) argue that in order to
produce improvements in calibration of probability
judgments it is necessary to provide performance
feedback/FVI, and not environmental feedback/TI,
although the latter is required to produce improve-
ments in discrimination (i.e. separating instances
when a target event will or will not occur). In a
probability judgment task, Stone and Opel (2000)
found support for their view and further found that
overconfidence was greater after provision of envi-
ronmental feedback/TI. Other researchers have also
found calibration to improve after provision of per-
formance feedback/FVI (e.g. Adams & Adams, 1958;
Benson & O¨nkal, 1992; Bornstein & Zickafoose,
1999; Lichtenstein & Fischhoff, 1980; Oskamp,
1962; O¨nkal & Muradog˘lu, 1995; Sharp, Cutler, &
Penrod, 1988). For this reason, the primary form of
feedback in our probabilistic forecasting task is
performance feedback/FVI in the form of information
about forecasters’ calibration. In addition, forecasters
also receive some environmental feedback/TI inci-
dentally, as is described below. It is worth noting
that, analyzing point forecasts only, Remus, O’Con-
nor, and Griggs (1996) have found performance
improvements via TI feedback relative to perfor-
mance feedback given in the form of MAPE scores.
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the first to ascribe to feedback a central role in behav-
iour. They proposed that feedback constitutes informa-
tion about behaviour which is then used to control
future behaviour. This idea has subsequently been
developed and elaborated. For example, Powers
(1973) argues that feedback is information about be-
haviour which can be compared against a cognitive
standard or ‘reference condition’. Differences between
current behaviour and the reference condition result in
changes in behaviour so as to reduce the mismatch.
This ‘error correction’ process is used to achieve a
system’s behavioral goals in the context of small
variations in the environment (which Powers refers to
as ‘disturbances’). Note that the idea of a reference
condition implies a mental representation of the ideal
desired goal state against which behavior can be
compared. Powers (1973) also proposes that there is a
hierarchy of goals such that at a low level wemay try to
reduce, say, error in prediction but at a higher level try
to fulfil our goals of mastery over the environment or
self-actualization.
Let us now try to apply these notions to the current
study. The reference condition, at a primary goal level,
we suggest is a representation of the amount of vari-
ability in the series. The feedback indicates how well
the behavioral output—which is a statement regarding
this variability in terms of an interval of a particular
width for a particular level of confidence—actually
corresponds to this representation across a range of
environmental disturbances, which are the different
characteristics of the time series presented. In our task,
as already noted, there are two kinds of feedback: (1)
environmental feedback/TI focusing on the way in
which properties of the stimulus series varies (for
example, that there are no long-term negative or
damped trends in the stimulus sets); and (2) calibration
feedback (the ‘hit rate’ or percent of true values of the
series falling within a set of intervals of a given
confidence level). The first of these two types of
feedback is implicit and the second explicit, but both
allow, at minimum, modification (or control) of the
behavioural output (the interval judgment). However,
as already reviewed, the literature suggests that the
latter form of feedback is the most effective for im-
proving calibration.
Now with respect to the proposed hierarchy of
goals, we suggest that a higher level goal thanaccurately capturing the variance of series by means
of one’s confidence intervals is a communicative one:
to inform others (in our case primarily the experi-
menter) of the uncertainty in the series, and thus in
the forecast itself. This is in line with Yaniv and
Foster’s (1995, 1997) idea that interval forecasts are
a trade-off between accuracy and informativeness.
They suggest that people may sacrifice accuracy (i.e.
insuring that the true value falls within the interval,
which can be attained by giving very wide intervals)
for the sake of informativeness (i.e. giving more
precise estimates, best attained by assessing rather
narrow intervals). For example, stating that the first
trans-Atlantic flight occurred some time between the
years 1800 and 2000 is highly likely to contain the
true answer, but is unlikely to be considered very
useful by a potential user of this estimate. In con-
trast, giving the interval 1920–1930 is likely to be
considered a much more useful estimate even if it
does not actually contain the true value. Communi-
cation is thus seen as an essential part of the
forecasting process.
Yaniv and Foster (1995, 1997) go further and
suggest that the accuracy-informativeness trade-off
is a reason for observed overconfidence in interval
judgments as the tendency to want to make intervals
more informative produces pressure to make them
narrower. Studies of interval judgments often insist on
90, 95 or even 99% confidence intervals which
generally require very wide, and correspondingly
uninformative, intervals thus the push towards nar-
rower intervals creates overconfidence. In our study,
we permit the forecasters to select their own confi-
dence level, thus both accuracy and informativeness
can be attained by reducing stated confidence levels
whilst also narrowing the intervals.2. Research hypotheses
2.1. Calibration and overconfidence
Following the results of the existing literature out-
lined above, our first hypothesis involves the pervasive
overconfidence revealed in judgmental predictions:
Hypothesis 1: Interval forecasts will initially
manifest overconfidence but this will be signifi-
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about their performance.
In the spirit of Powers’ cybernetic model we
propose that our forecasters will have a hierarchy
of goals which they will try to satisfy using the
available feedback. Their primary goal will be to
match the width of intervals to their representation of
the variability of the series in order to achieve good
calibration:
Hypothesis 2: Improvement in calibration due to
feedback will be the result of forecasters being
better able to reflect in their confidence intervals
the variability in the time series.
2.2. Accuracy vs. informativeness
As we have seen, Yaniv and Foster (1995, 1997)
found that people have a tendency to prefer informa-
tiveness to accuracy when providing confidence
intervals. That is, narrow intervals may be considered
more useful (i.e. more informative) for decision
making than wide ones, but they are less likely to
contain the true value (i.e. less accurate), all else
being equal. Yaniv and Foster argue that this is one
reason why people tend not to increase their ranges
sufficiently with practice. In accordance with these
arguments, we anticipate that a secondary goal of our
forecasters will be to reduce the widths of their
confidence intervals in order for them to be more
informative. In order for them to do this and satisfy
their primary goal of good calibration they must
therefore simultaneously reduce the confidence levels
they choose for their intervals:
Hypothesis 3: Over sessions there will be a
decrease in the width of the judgment intervals
provided and an accompanying decrease in the
confidence levels selected.3. Method
3.1. Participants
A total of 139 third-year business students at
Bilkent University, Turkey completed the experimenttowards extra credit in a forecasting course (157
started but 18 did not complete all four sessions).
The gender ratio was approximately equal.
3.2. Materials
A total of 96 52-week time-series graphs were used
to elicit one-period-ahead forecasts. The last four
values of the displayed series were also presented in
tabular form next to the graph. Constructed series
were used, and the participants were told that they
showed the values of real Turkish stocks with undis-
closed stock names and time periods.
The series varied in terms of the mean value of the
stocks (three stock price levels: low, medium, high),
degree of first-order autocorrelation (four levels: ap-
proximately 0.6, 0.3, 0 or 0.3), amount of noise (two
levels: low and high), trend (two levels: positive linear
trend and no trend), and scale (two levels: scaled-up
50%, not scaled-up) (see Fig. 1 for three example
graphs). There were also three different levels of mean
stock price which, when combined factorially with the
other features of the series described above, results in
the 96 different series. These 96 series were semi-
randomly allocated to the three experimental ses-
sions—that is to say that a complete factorial arrange-
ment was maintained within each session for all
attributes apart from mean level, with approximately
equal numbers of the three mean levels in each
session.
The parameters were all selected to reflect the
behavior of actual Turkish stock price series at the
time the experiment was conducted. For example,
given the high inflation rate, Turkish stocks tended
not to display any long-term negative trends, and
were more likely to show positive than negative
autocorrelation.
3.3. Procedure
The participants were tested in four groups of
approximately equal size (four different sections of
the third-year course in Forecasting). The experiment
lasted four sessions, as described below.
Session 1: Participants were asked to make one-
step-ahead probabilistic interval forecasts for each of
32 graphically presented time-series. At the outset,
forecasters could choose a percentage confidence for
Fig. 1. Example stimulus graphs.
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had to use the same percentage for the entire session.
Session 2: Three days later the same participants
received feedback about the performance of their
earlier forecasts before making a further set of fore-
casts for 32 different time series. Again forecasters
were free to choose their confidence percentage, but
again had to employ it for the entire session.Session 3: Three days later the procedure for
Session 2 was repeated (i.e. following feedback,
forecasters chose their confidence percentage and
made predictions for a new set of 32 time series).
Session 4: After another 3 days, feedback from
Session 3 was given, followed by the forecasters
completing a questionnaire. Finally, the participants
were debriefed.
At the start of the first session the participants were
given a single sheet of written instructions in Turkish
which explained the task and the general nature of the
experiment. A specific example was also given of
how to construct well-calibrated confidence intervals.
An English translation of these instructions is given in
Appendix A. The written instructions were reinforced
verbally and any questions were answered by the
experimenters.4. Results
4.1. Calibration and overconfidenceHypothesis 1: Interval forecasts will initially
manifest overconfidence but this will be signifi-
cantly reduced as forecasters receive feedback
about their performance.
This hypothesis is strongly supported. The calibra-
tion curves for each group show clear improvement
over sessions although there is a suggestion that the
forecasters may become underconfident with addition-
al practice—the best calibrated group to begin with
became clearly underconfident by the third session.
The overall pattern for the four groups was similar,
however, so the composite curves are shown in Fig. 2
for simplicity. The ANOVA results support the con-
clusion derived from inspection of the calibration
curves as there was a significant main effect of session
on calibration (F2,270=33.7, P<0.001) with calibration
improving between both the first and second, and the
second and third sessions.Hypothesis 2: Improvement in calibration due to
feedback will be the result of forecasters being
better able to reflect in their confidence intervals
the variability in the time series.
Fig. 2. Calibration curves for all subjects by experimental session.
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and the percent confidence can be regarded as an
estimate of the standard deviation of the stimulus
series:
r ¼ x N
z
where ðx NÞ is half the confidence interval width and
z is the percent confidence expressed as a z score2. By
this method we calculated each participant’s estimated
standard deviation for each stimulus series and corre-
lated these with the true value of the standard deviation
in the series so as to produce three correlation coef-
ficients for each participant, one for each of the three
sessions. The average correlation between actual and
estimated standard deviation for each session was r ¼
0:85; 0.90 and 0.92, respectively. After transforming
these correlation coefficients using a Fisher’s z trans-
formation, we performed a completely within-subjects
ANOVA which showed a significant improvement in
the ability of our forecasters to match their probabilis-
tic responses to the changes in uncertainty in the2 This assumes a normally distributed probability distribution
function symmetrical around the ‘best guess’ of the position of the
next value in the stimulus series—this assumption may not be
correct, particularly for the trended series, but unfortunately we have
no way of checking this from our data.stimulus series (F2;276 ¼ 63:09;P < 0:001). Hypothe-
sis 2 was therefore supported.
4.2. Accuracy vs. informativeness
Hypothesis 3: Over sessions there will be a
decrease in the width of the judgment intervals
provided and an accompanying decrease in the
confidence levels selected.
Contrary to our expectations, there was a signifi-
cant increase in the average width of the confidence
interval given (1.68 in session 1, 2.33 in session 2 and
2.79 in session 3; F2;276 ¼ 96:27;P < 0:001 ). Also
contrary to our hypothesis the percent usage of each
response category (see Fig. 3: categories 1 to 5 are
defined as 50–59%, 60–69%, 70–79%, 80–89% and
90–99%, respectively) shows a slight tendency for the
forecasters to shift to giving higher confidence per-
centages over the three sessions (ANOVA showed this
to be a statistically significant tendency: F2;270 ¼ 7:4
3;P ¼ 0:001). However, a more accurate description
of the pattern in Fig. 3 is that responses become more
extreme. Further, it is interesting to note that confi-
dence levels actually drop after first set of feedback,
before increasing again after the second set of feed-
back. Overall, it seems that improvement in hit rates,
rather than increases in confidence, provide the main
thrust in improving the participants’ interval calibra-
tion. To be specific, hit rate steadily improves over
sessions (F2;270 ¼ 105:94;P < 0:001)—from a mean
hit rate of approximately 67% in Session 1 to about
77% in Session 2 to roughly 87% in Session 3. This
provides further support for Hypothesis 1 but it seems
that Hypothesis 3 is definitely not supported.Fig. 3. Distributions of probability usage by experimental session.
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It seems that in a judgmental interval forecasting
task people can quite quickly become well-calibrated
when provided with calibration feedback. This sup-
ports the idea that previous failures to improve cali-
bration through training are the consequence of
unfavourable task features. However, an alternative
interpretation of our findings is possible. As already
mentioned, a persistent finding of research into the
calibration of subjective probability judgment is the
so-called ‘hard–easy effect’ whereby overconfidence
is observed for poor performance (hit rates below
about 70%), underconfidence where performance is
good (hit rates above about 80%), and good calibra-
tion at levels of performance between these extremes
(see, e.g. Lichtenstein et al., 1982; Suantak et al.,
1996). In our study, we observed a similar pattern of
results including some underconfidence in the final
session where the average hit rate was 87%. In fact,
the correlation between the average hit rate and under/
overconfidence (n=12: four groups times three ses-
sions) was r ¼ 0:88: It is therefore consistent with
our results that the participants achieved good cali-
bration simply by increasing the width of the confi-
dence intervals they gave, thereby improving hit rate,
whilst maintaining more-or-less the same level of
confidence, or possibly increasing it. If this were the
case then we might anticipate increased underconfi-
dence if further practice were given. In other words,
our forecasters may not have learnt either to match the
width of intervals to the confidence percent given or
to match their combined responses (i.e. both the width
of the interval and their confidence) to the true level of
uncertainty in the series and thus cannot really be said
to have improved either their calibration or their
discrimination (i.e. their ability to match their uncer-
tainty responses to changes in uncertainty in the
stimulus materials) as a result of the feedback given
(see, e.g. Yates, 1982).
If such a ‘hedging’ strategy was widely used, the
average confidence should remain approximately
constant or increase across the three sessions (which
it did: 82, 81 and 84%), whereas there should be a
significant increase in the average width of the
confidence interval given (which, as we have already
seen, was also the case: 1.68, 2.33, 2.79). However,
a slightly more fine-grained analysis reveals that thecorrelation between the width of confidence interval
and level of confidence increases over the three
sessions ðr ¼ 0:37; 0.50 and 0.51, respectively)
which suggests that our forecasters were at least
learning to match confidence-interval width to con-
fidence percentage.
Perhaps more compelling evidence against such a
hedging strategy comes from our analysis of improve-
ment in our forecasters’ discrimination which we
performed in order to test Hypothesis 2. Thus, it
appears that both the calibration and discrimination
of our forecasters improved over the three sessions. It
should be noted here that our explicit performance
feedback was intended to improve calibration rather
than discrimination. According to Stone and Opel
(2000), it is only environment feedback that should
improve discrimination—as noted earlier, our task
contained such feedback implicitly, and therefore it
must be to this feedback that we attribute the observed
improvements in discrimination.
The improvement in calibration that we observed
therefore seems to be the result of at least two
tendencies: first, to increase interval width whilst
keeping percent confidence constant (thereby increas-
ing hit rate and, initially at least, improving calibra-
tion); second, to match probability responses (interval
width and percent confidence) better to the true
variance in the series. Both these tendencies are
compatible with the view of overconfidence (and the
hard–easy effect) being the consequence of response
error. If it is assumed that confidence intervals are
initially too narrow for both the given percent confi-
dence and true variance in the series, then this error is
subsequently removed by the application of the two
tendencies described above.
An alternative account is that our forecasters ini-
tially underestimated the amount of variance in the
series but gave appropriate probability responses.
Subsequently, their ability to estimate the variance
in the series improved which is then manifest in their
more appropriate responses. In other words, the initial
error may have been in the estimation of the variance
rather than in the expression of an accurate estimate as
a probability response. We cannot differentiate these
two accounts on the basis of our data but there is some
evidence that people are quite good at estimating the
variance of time series (Fike, 1977; Fike & Ferrell,
1977, 1978), which would seem to support the re-
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types of error are present (see, e.g. Juslin, Olsson, &
Bjorkman, 1997).
Note that neither account explains why the initial
bias occurs in our experiment. In general-knowledge
tasks people may assume they will attain an interme-
diate level of performance (e.g. 75% for two-alterna-
tive, forced-choice questions) whereas the questions
usually used in studies produce lower levels of perfor-
mance (see, e.g. Suantak et al., 1996, Fig. 11). It is more
difficult to explain the initial bias in this way in our task
because it is not clear what an intermediate amount of
variance might be, and in any case, the true amount of
variance varied across the stimulus series. However, it
is possible that the average level of variance in our
series was greater than what our participants expected
on the basis of their experience with real Turkish stocks
or their overall expectations from the stock market at
the time the experiment was conducted (even though
they were told that the series were not real-time).
From a practical perspective our results suggest
that training forecasters in probabilistic forecasting
may be a realistic proposition although there is a
question mark over the generalizability of any such
training to different types of series from those in the
training set. Further, as we have already discussed,
there is a suggestion from these data that forecasters
may ‘overshoot’ and become underconfident. Thus
further experiments with more sessions and different
types of series need to be conducted to provide
detailed answers to these questions and to permit the
design of appropriate training programmes.
The fact that there was no strong tendency to try
and attain good calibration by picking the top level of
confidence (99%) and giving huge intervals—the
ultimate expression of the hedging strategy described
earlier—provides some support for Yaniv and Foster’s
(1995, 1997) assertion that people prefer to give
narrower, more informative intervals—it also suggests
that participants in our experiment were not simply
treating the exercise as a game. Some further com-
ments from the participants explicitly referring to a
desire to avoid the use of very wide intervals support
these claims:
‘they would be meaningless’
‘they would have no value to whoever wants to use
them’‘how could they possibly help in picking stocks if
they’re really wide’
‘it doesn’t make sense because it’s so easy to give
very wide intervals, choose 99% and get perfect
match—but what worth could this have for people
making investment decisions’
However, the desire to be informative does not seem
to us an explanation for overconfidence as it begs
the question of why people do not just give lower
percent confidence if they prefer narrower intervals.
One reason why this tendency to give lower confi-
dence intervals may not have been observed in this
study is that, as we suggest in the Introduction, the
communicative goals of the task are secondary to
achieving good calibration. Thus if we had increased
the number of sessions then we may have observed
reduction of both confidence interval width and
corresponding stated levels of confidence. Another
possibility, though, is that our student participants
were already used to the convention of 95% confi-
dence intervals and that this acted as an anchor for
their chosen confidence levels. If so then this would
act as a strong deterrent to reducing confidence
levels—the same would apply to most professional
forecasters.
Finally, we wish to comment briefly on the
similarities and differences between our study and
that of O’Connor and Lawrence (1989). As with our
study, these authors examined the effects of feedback
on judgmental confidence intervals in forecasting
from graphical time series. However, as we indicated
in the Introduction, the similarities between the two
studies are largely superficial, there being substantive
differences including the nature of the stimulus
series, the kind of judgmental confidence intervals
elicited, the type of feedback, and consequently the
form of analyses that could be carried out. Despite
all these differences, it is interesting to note that our
conclusions are much the same: that judgmental
confidence intervals were initially overconfident but
improved significantly after feedback. That two rath-
er disparate approaches arrive at the same conclu-
sions suggests that these findings are robust, hence
highlighting the potential for using prediction inter-
vals for reliably communicating uncertainties in
diverse domains.
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Dear Participant:
In this study, we request that you examine the 32
time series presented and make forecasts for each
series. The time series presented to you show the
weekly closing prices of various stocks taken from
various time periods in previous years. We would like
you to convey your one-period-ahead predictions via
interval forecasts for the next week’s (i.e. next Fri-
day’s) closing price. To do so, you first need to choose
a confidence percentage (between 50 and 99%) that
you feel comfortable with. Please note that you are
required to use the same confidence percentage for all
the stocks (i.e. time series) within the same session. If
you would like to or if you think you need to, you may
change your percentage in other sessions. After
specifying your confidence percentage, you are asked
to specify the lowest and the highest possible values
(with your selected confidence percentage) that a
particular stock’s closing price could assume for the
next period. For example, let’s say you’ve chosen
75% as your confidence percentage3. This means that,
given 100 prediction intervals you’ve specified, you
expect 75 of them to include the realized value, while
expecting the realized values to fall outside of the
limits you’ve given for the remaining 25 intervals.
Our study consists of four sessions. In the first,
second and third sessions, you’ll be asked to construct3 Half the participants received 75% as the figure in the
example whilst the other half received 90%. Our analyses showed a
significant anchoring effect due to these different examples such
that participants tended to choose a higher confidence value if
presented with the 90% example than the 75%. There were no other
discernible effects of these different anchors on calibration,
however.your interval forecasts. Accordingly, you’ll be receiv-
ing feedback in the beginning of second, third and
fourth sessions. You will not be asked to make
forecasts in the fourth session.
THANK YOU FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION IN
THIS STUDY.References
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